International Arbitration

AT THE

Opening of The Twentieth Century

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International Arbitration at the Opening of the Twentieth Century.

International arbitration is a comparatively modern thing, belonging almost entirely to the period commencing with the opening of the nineteenth century. The arbitrations before that time were for the most part between individuals, communities, different branches of the same dynasty, or between vassal states and feudal chiefs, rather than between nations in our modern sense of the term. This method of settling difficulties between peoples came about with the decline of despotism and the growth of political liberty, and the consequent development and realization of the idea of nationality in its modern sense. Nations, in the sense of free and independent peoples, whose unity is natural and voluntary, and that observe in a measure the limits which have been marked out for them by the providence of God in the geographic structure of the earth and in the historic development of races, did not exist in any permanent way much more than a hundred years ago. The movement toward settled and self-governed nations, which has resulted in the building up and compacting of this great Republic and in the unification of Great Britain, of France, of Italy, of Germany, and of other nations in both hemispheres to a greater or less extent, grew out of the

many liberating and civilizing forces which have been playing on society since the beginning of the Christian era, to go no farther back, and with it has come sufficient international respect and unselfishness, a sufficient sense of the mutual interdependence of nations, to make arbitration not only possible but natural and inevitable. So long as feudalism remained, international arbitration was impossible, because there were really no nations to arbitrate. Even after the nations were somewhat settled in their proper boundaries, so long as they were ruled by men whose despotic and world-grasping spirit led them year after year into schemes for the subjection of other peoples, international arbitration in any general and settled way was still impossible. With the fall of Napoleon, in whom this spirit found its final embodiment, the old order of things was broken and the new began to appear.

Arbitration implies independent and mutually respecting parties standing over against each other, with difficulties which they cannot settle themselves, because of the strong feeling which each has that he is in the right and that he cannot therefore yield to the other's view. It also implies a conviction that there is a better and more rational, or at least a safer and less expensive, way of settling difficulties than that of fighting like brutes about them. It further implies confidence in the fairness and good sense of one's fellowmen, who may be called in to take the dispute and sit down with it in the impartial court of reason and say how it shall be adjusted.

It may easily be seen, therefore, why arbitration, though it may have taken place frequently between individuals and small bodies of men, could not, in the moral state of

society then existing, have occurred much on an international scale prior to the opening of the nineteenth century. Not a little of the spirit of unrespecting selfishness and greed of the past centuries still lingers, and numberless jealousies and ill-feelings left behind by former aggressions and acts of injustice have rendered arbitration, until comparatively recently, much less frequent than it ought to have been; but its appearance in the nineteenth century in many important cases is a proof that not only individual men but the nations in their dealings one with another have gotten a good deal above the brute and have begun to be largely and generously human.

Before a detailed analysis of the arbitration movement during the past century is given, attention should be called a little more specifically to what arbitration in a simpler and narrower way accomplished in the past; for the present movement is not alone the outgrowth of Christian civilization in general, but also of the arbitrations themselves which are scattered along through the previous centuries. The movement has a purely human and rational side, so that even among pagan nations and before the Christian era cases of this mode of settling disputes are recorded, and many others doubtless occurred which have passed into oblivion. The madness and insanity of war did not always prevail. There were lucid moments when the real human nature temporarily asserted itself. Two sons of Darius settled the question of the succession to the throne by arbitration. Cyrus sought the good offices of a Prince of India to end a dispute between him and the king of Assyria. In the

Greek civilization, where the state was everything and love of country an all-absorbing passion, cases of arbitration between Greek and Greek were not infrequent, though no Greek state seems ever to have arbitrated with a foreign country. In these the Amphictyonic Councils, famous sages, victors in the games and especially the Oracle at Delphi were the arbitrators. The system of law and of law courts, in which the citizens of a country determine their questions by a forced litigation under the power of the civil authorities, has its root in practically the same principles as arbitration. In the Roman empire this system prevailed, and the simpler method of voluntary arbitration was not much known.

When Christianity came with its doctrine of love and human brotherhood, arbitration became a frequent and probably the usual method by which difficulties between individual Christians were settled. The reader will remember Paul's passionate appeal to the Corinthians in behalf of this simple Christian method as against the forced and selfish litigations in the law courts.

In later times the bishops' trials became a fixed institution among Christians. If the history of these Christian settlements by arbitration could be written, it would take a very large library to contain the accounts of them. They have been numerous through all the Christian centuries, and are still frequent in our own time. Not a year has passed, it may be safely asserted, since the first organization of Christian societies, in which many a bishop, minister or wise Christian layman, either alone or with others, has not by arbitration or mediation adjusted differences between brethren. The

practice thus created and fostered by Christian love and forbearance has largely leavened the whole of society with its influence, and its reasonableness is now nearly universally recognized, even where temporary gusts of passion or hereditary prejudices prevent its employment in particular cases. It is on this basis of Christian principle and practice, running back to the days of the Prince of Peace, that the whole structure of modern international arbitration rests.

What was found so useful and practicable among individuals was naturally seen to be just as capable of successful application to groups and communities of men and it began early to be so applied. Private war, the great curse of the middle ages, was banished from European society only after the application to it of arbitration and arbitration courts. Feudalism had spread this evil everywhere. Challenges to battle were made for the most trivial and absurd causes. A state of almost utter lawlessness came to prevail, and strife and bloodshed were perpetual. Religious sentiment was invoked against the evil. The clergy preached peace. Men went from village to village proclaiming it in the name of Christ. Great councils were held to promote it. The popes sent out encyclicals in its behalf. The "Peace of God" was proclaimed, and certain days, places and callings were placed under the protection of its sheltering wing. Religious fraternities or peace associations to reconcile enemies were formed. Pledges of peace were administered to the fierce barons over holy relics. But the tide of hatred and of blood surged on. Finally, as a last remedy, when all the efforts put forth for nearly two

centuries against the evil seemed about to end in failure, courts of arbitration were formed by the barons, the nobles, the bishops and the cities, and for two centuries and more were applied from time to time to the settlement of the almost endless misunderstandings and quarrels of the time. In this way private war was ultimately banished from society.

From the beginning of the sixteenth to the opening of the nineteenth century we have the great war movements of nationalities — aggression, bloodshed and desolation on a colossal scale. The feudal lords are replaced by kings and emperors in whom the old feudal spirit still lives. Private war with its everlasting bickerings and its petty troops of galloping dragoons and murderous squads of footmen gives place to war between sovereigns and whole peoples, with their great generals, their large armies, their deep-seated hatreds and their craftily laid plans of territorial extension. No sooner are national boundaries marked off than they are disturbed. The map of Europe changes with nearly every campaign. "I saw," said Grotius, writing at this time, "throughout all Christendom a readiness to make war which would cause the very barbarians to blush for shame." England, France, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, were almost continuous battlefields on which the sound of the cannon was always heard and the blood never ceased to flow. This long, gloomy period of international aggression and crime,— the age of Charles the Fifth, of Henry the Eighth, of Bloody Mary, of Frederick the Great, of Charles the Twelfth, of Louis the Fourteenth, of Napoleon the First;

the age of the Inquisition and of the French Revolution; the age of the Seven Years' War, of the Thirty Years' War, or rather the age of perpetual war, — reached its culmination at the opening of the nineteenth century in the Napoleonic campaigns which ended at Waterloo. Then a reaction came. The common conscience began to revolt at the sight of human beings forever devouring one another and of selfish, haughty sovereigns treading down and destroying all the most sacred rights and interests of men.

The first steps of this revolt had been taken in the seventeenth century. Christian conviction had become such and Christian principles had so influenced thought that the war system began to be attacked at its very roots. It was declared to be both unchristian and unreasonable. Hugo Grotius, the great Dutch jurist and theologian, who laid the foundations of the modern juridic movement against war, attacked it particularly on the latter ground. He declared that war was a cruel and unsatisfactory method, that its horrors should be mitigated and that arbitration should be substituted for it as far as practicable in the settlement of difficulties. He expounded his doctrine with so much erudition and force that he deeply affected the thought of Europe, and laid the foundation of a better international law. Publicists took up the problem which he had raised. The law of nations was unfolded and emphasized. Projects for universal peace were drawn up. Locke, Kant, Penn, Pufendorf, Vattel, Montesquieu, Bentham and others drew up schemes which have had a powerful influence on thought ever since. Lessing and Herder put the new ideas into verse. The foundations of the modern movement

were likewise laid deep in the religious sentiment by Menno Simons, by George Fox, and later by John Wesley.

Soon after the opening of the nineteenth century the movement against war took on an organized and definitive form. This organized movement growing out of these historic preparations and coming as a revolt against the bloody régime of the three preceding centuries, followed two lines of development, one sentimental, the other juridic. The sentimental, or that for the awakening and education of public sentiment against war, manifested itself during the nineteenth century in the organization of peace societies, in sermons and public lectures, in literary productions, through the press, through international congresses and conferences, through public manifestos and memorials to governments; the juridic, or that for the creation of legal remedies for war, expressed itself in improved diplomacy, in attempts to reform international law, in arbitration and in efforts for the establishing of permanent treaties of arbitration and a permanent international tribunal. These two lines of movement, one of which is just as important as the other, have been interlaced at every stage and have grown strong together. The culmination of the arbitration side of the movement in actual practice during the last decade and a half has been very remarkable, as is now well known.

The Jay Treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain, provided for the settlement of three questions by mixed commissions. The first of these commissions, appointed to determine what river was

meant by the St. Croix in the treaty of 1783, rendered its decision in 1798. The second commission failed to render a decision, and the matter of British claims referred to it was settled by treaty in 1802. The third commission, appointed to determine the loss suffered by American vessels at the hands of Great Britain during the war between that country and France, closed its labors in 1804. These settlements by mixed commissions were not formal arbitrations, though they were essentially so. The method of adjusting disputes by joint commissions has continued in vogue up to the present time, and no less than three hundred controversies between nations have in this way been disposed of since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Many of these were questions of claims, but some of them, like the Alaska boundary dispute, were controversies of the first importance.

The Treaty of Ghent, December 24, 1814, provided for the formal arbitration of three questions between the United States and Great Britain. The first of these referred to certain islands in the Passamaquoddy Bay, and was decided by commissioners in 1817. The solution of the second question, that of the northeastern boundary of the United States, was attempted by commissioners in 1816. They failed to agree, and in 1827 the question was referred to the King of the Netherlands, whose decision, in 1831, was waived by both governments and the matter was finally settled by compromise. The third question, that of the northern boundary of the United States along the Great Lakes, was partially settled by commissioners in 1822, and

finished in 1842 by treaty. These commissions had an umpire, and the settlements were therefore formal arbitrations. Similar settlements of claims by arbitral commissions were made at this early period between the United States and Spain and France and Russia.

Since the time of the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, about two hundred and sixty international controversies have been settled by arbitration, or an average of about three a year for the whole period of ninety years. More than sixty of these were in the decade from 1890 to 1900 and sixty of them have occurred since the twentieth century opened. So common has the practice of arbitration become in recent years that cases are nowadays constantly pending between some of the nations, there being several at the present time. The United States has been a party to over sixty of these settlements; Great Britain to more than seventy; while fifteen of the cases have been between these two English-speaking nations alone. France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Belgium, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland, Japan, Afghanistan, Persia, China, Morocco, Mexico and Liberia have each been parties to one or more of these settlements, France, with over thirty cases, coming next to the United States and Great Britain. All of the South American and Central American States except two or three have had arbitrations.

It is to be noticed that along with these cases adjusted by arbitration must be placed a large number settled by diplomacy, many of which would formerly have produced war. Many modern diplomats have been in the

truest sense of the term peacemakers, and have not only prevented war, but the necessity even of arbitration.

The nations referred to as having taken part in these pacific settlements — some thirty-seven of them all told — cover a large part of the habitable portion of the globe, and include a considerable number of countries not usually thought to be much civilized.

The cases referred to cover nearly every sort of question with which nations have to deal in their relations to one another — questions of boundary and violation of territory, of trespasses committed and injuries received in time of war, of the murder of citizens of one country by those of another, of disputed sovereignty over islands, questions of protectorates, of seizure of ships, of interference with commerce, of fisheries, etc. Some of the controversies have been the occasion of diplomatic correspondence carried on for months, sometimes for years, by some of the ablest statesmen of modern times. In some instances, after diplomacy had exhausted its resources, the cases were dropped for a time, only to be taken up again and finally referred to disinterested parties. Large sums of money have been involved in a number of the disputes, no less than $22,000,000 having changed hands in the three cases between the United States and Great Britain in 1871. The sense of national dignity and honor has often been keenly touched in the earlier stages of the controversies, and the newspapers on both sides have not infrequently tried to kindle the flame of war.

All these difficulties, though of exactly the same kind as those which in former times resulted speedily in disastrous

and often long-continued wars, have, however, finally been settled with no great delay, with a trifling outlay of money, and without the least injury to the self-respect or honor of any country involved. The decisions have, with one or two trifling exceptions, been accepted cheerfully and faithfully carried out, and not the shadow of a war-cloud has ever been produced by one of them. On the contrary, the result has nearly invariably been increased mutual respect and a greater willingness to coöperate in all practicable ways for the common good.

For many years past the number of difficulties settled by arbitration has greatly exceeded the number of international controversies which have led to war, and the rule of the past has become the exception of the present. But one war makes more fuss in the world and gets more notice in the newspapers than a hundred arbitrations. These arbitration settlements have taken place so noiselessly and with so little public excitement that the ordinary well-read citizen could not name more than three or four out of the whole number, and the real triumphs of the principle are therefore only vaguely and imperfectly realized. Arbitration as a method of settling international controversies has already won its case and justified itself at the bar of human reason, and has become, as Mr. David Dudley Field said in the last paper but one that he ever wrote, a recognized part of the public law of the civilized nations.

The crowning event of the nineteenth century in the matter of arbitration, an event which grew out of the whole work of the century, was the establishment, at its

close, of the Permanent International Court at The Hague. Such a court of arbitration had been advocated from the second decade of the century by the Peace Societies, and later by the International Law Association, the Peace Congresses, the Interparliamentary Union, national and local bar associations, special arbitration conferences, church assembles, women's organizations, etc.

The Rescript of the Czar of Russia which brought about the Conference at The Hague was issued on the 24th of August, 1898. The Conference met on the 18th of May, 1899, under the auspices of the Netherlands government. It was composed of one hundred delegates sent by twenty-six nations, including all the first-class powers of the world. It sat until the 29th day of July. It was called more particularly to consider the question of a possible reduction of the armaments and the war budgets of the nations. It found itself unable to do anything important in this direction, and in response to the multiplied appeals which came to it from Western Europe and America, it took up the subject of a permanent system of arbitration, and at its close signed, with two other conventions, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. This convention, in addition to providing for special mediation to prevent war and for commissions of inquiry in cases of difference where the facts were in dispute, made provision for the creation of a Permanent International Court of Arbitration, which should be open, for the adjudication of disputes, to all the signatory powers, and to any others that might subsequently be permitted to become parties to the convention.

Within two years a sufficient number of the signatories had ratified the convention to put it into effect, and in April, 1901, the Court was declared by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs to be properly organized and ready for business. The Convention was finally ratified by all the signatory powers except China, Turkey, Persia and Montenegro, and when the second Hague Conference met the total number of members of the Court was seventy-six, each of the signatory powers being authorized by the Convention to appoint not to exceed four.

The Court, after some studied neglect by certain powers, was put into successful operation by the United States and Mexico by the reference to it, in May, 1902, of the controversy about the Pious Fund of the Californias, which had been long pending between the two countries. The case was argued in September and October of that year by counsel of the two governments before the tribunal of five members chosen from the Court, and at the end of four weeks the award, sustaining the contention of the United States, was rendered. The expenses of the trial were small. The judgment of the Court was cheerfully accepted by the Mexican government, the amount of the claims paid, and the controversy passed out of existence.

This auspicious opening of the Permanent International Court of Arbitration was followed by the reference to it the following year of the controversy which arose in connection with the Venezuela trouble as to whether the three powers which had used force against Venezuela in an effort to collect debts due their citizens should have preference over the pacific creditors in the payment of

these claims from the revenues from two ports which had been set apart for this purpose. In this famous case eleven of the powers of the world were contestants before the Court. The decision of the tribunal, which consisted of three members chosen from the Court, was rendered after long and patient deliberation. It was a surprise and disappointment to many of the friends of peace, but it was loyally accepted by all the powers concerned.

Before the opening of the second Hague Conference two other disputes — the House Tax Case between Japan on the one hand and Great Britain, France and Germany on the other, and the question of the protectorate of France over the Sultan of Muscat, to which Great Britain and France were parties — were referred to the Court and happily disposed of.

It will thus be seen that the permanent international tribunal for the adjustment of differences between the nations was organized and entered successfully on its great career much sooner than even the most sanguine had a decade ago dared to hope.

But the work done in its organization, immensely important as it was, was an incomplete one. Not all the nations of the world were parties to the Convention, and none of them were pledged by treaty stipulations to submit controversies to the jurisdiction of the newly organized tribunal. An attempt to remedy the first defect was made at the second Pan-American Conference held at Mexico City in the winter of 1901–02. The important work of this Conference was done along the line of arbitration. All the states of the Western Hemisphere

signed by their representatives in that gathering a protocol declaring their adherence to the Hague Conventions, and the United States and Mexico were authorized to take the necessary steps for the opening of these conventions to them. A second protocol signed at Mexico City provided for the obligatory reference of all questions of claims to the arbitration of the Hague Court.

The second defect in the constitution of the Hague Court, if defect it may be called, it has been sought to remedy by securing the conclusion of special treaties of obligatory arbitration between the nations two and two or in groups. This movement has culminated with surprising and encouraging rapidity.

Previously to the setting up of the Hague Court all efforts to secure treaties of arbitration between nations had failed. As early as 1883 the Swiss government had approached our own with this end in view, but nothing came of it. The general treaty of arbitration for the American republics drafted at the first Pan-American Conference in 1889–1890 lapsed and was never ratified. Ten years of earnest effort for an arbitration treaty between Great Britain and the United States ended in the signing of the Olney-Pauncefote treaty at the opening of 1897. This treaty also failed in the United States Senate. The same year a general treaty of arbitration was negotiated between Italy and the Argentine Republic, but it never went into effect.

The labor spent in behalf of these unratified treaties both among the people and in the halls of legislation had a powerful enlightening influence, and contributed much to the success of the Hague Conference.

After the Hague Convention went into effect and the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established, new efforts began to be put forth for special treaties of obligatory arbitration, this time stipulating reference of controversies to the newly established tribunal. These efforts have been remarkably successful, though not yet completely so. No less than fifty-one treaties of this type were signed before the opening of the second Hague Conference on June 15, 1907, and since the second Hague Conference the number has increased to about eighty, twenty-four of which were negotiated by Secretary Root between January, 1908, and February, 1909, when he retired from the State Department. These treaties have all been ratified by the Senate, and most of them already proclaimed by the President. In addition to the seventy-seven treaties given in the list on pp. 21–23, fifteen others, all of them, except the Mexico-Persian treaty, between South American countries and Spain and South American countries themselves, must be added, carrying the whole number to above ninety. These fifteen treaties were signed before October 14, 1903, when the Franco-British treaty was announced.

These special treaties of obligatory arbitration, with three or four exceptions, lack much of being ideal, as they run for but five years, and provide only for the reference to the Hague Court of questions of a judicial order and those regarding the interpretation of treaties. With the exception of the treaties between Denmark on the one hand and The Netherlands, Italy and Portugal on the other, which have no limitations either in regard to time or to classes of cases, they all exclude from their

operation questions which affect the "vital interests" and the "honor" of the signatories, — very vague and indefinite conceptions. The Swedish-Norwegian treaty does, however, stipulate that if a dispute shall be thought to involve vital interests or honor, this preliminary question shall first be referred to the Hague Court for determination. But in spite of their limitations, these treaties mark a great step forward. The simple fact that great and mighty nations have become willing to pledge themselves in advance to submit important classes of disputes to a disinterested tribunal, the creation of their own joint action, speaks more eloquently than any words can possibly do of the growing international respect for law, of the more rational and humane attitude which the nations in general now bear toward one another, an attitude before which war with its unspeakable cruelties and its conspicuous failures of justice cannot long survive.

The second Peace Conference at The Hague during the summer of 1907 greatly advanced the cause of arbitration toward its final triumph. It enlarged and strengthened the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, adopted at the Conference of 1899, under which the Court of Arbitration was established. It provided that in case either of the governments parties to a dispute shall decline to arbitrate when requested to do so, the other party may go directly to the Bureau of the Hague Court and publicly ask for the arbitration of the Controversy, a provision which when carried out will make it extremely improbable that any nation will, in face of the public opinion of the world,

refuse to submit to arbitration any except the most extreme case.

The Conference, again, drafted a convention which prohibits the use of force for the collection of contractual debts from debtor nations until arbitration has first been tried or refused. This convention virtually brings all questions of money indemnity under the principle of obligatory arbitration, as it is in the highest degree improbable that any debtor nation would ever refuse to arbitrate a question of this kind.

The article in the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which provides for the creation of Commissions of Inquiry in cases where the dispute is chiefly concerned with facts, is properly to be classed with the arbitration provisions, for, as was proved in the Dogger Bank incident, such commissions, while not formally so, will in practice prove to be truly arbitration boards. The second Hague Conference strengthened the provisions for the creation of such commissions of inquiry so as to make them more efficient.

But the enormous progress which arbitration has made in the public opinion of the world is illustrated in nothing better than in the action of the second Hague Conference on the subject of obligatory arbitration. The principle of obligatory arbitration was approved by the Conference without a dissenting vote. Unanimous also was the declaration that certain differences, particularly those having to do with the interpretation of treaties, are susceptible of being submitted to obligatory arbitration without any restriction. The form of treaty of obligatory arbitration which was proposed by the United States

delegation to the Conference, which stipulated that certain classes of controversies should go spontaneously to the Hague Court, received the votes of thirty-five of the forty-four delegations, and only five voted against it, four abstaining from voting. The vote in favor of the proposition was therefore, by nations, seven to one (by the populations represented, it was even greater), and but for the rule of unanimity which governed the action of the Conference, we should to-day have a general treaty of obligatory arbitration covering all questions of a judicial order and those arising in the interpretation of treaties binding the great body of the nations together. The delegations which voted against the American proposition at The Hague were those of Germany, Austria, Greece, Roumania and Turkey. But Germany, which led this opposition, was careful to explain that she was not opposed to obligatory arbitration in principle, but was not ready to sign an agreement of this kind with all the powers, the more backward as well as the more advanced.

It appears from these facts that arbitration has already essentially triumphed, and there is little doubt that by the end of the third Hague Conference the cause will have been completely won. Indeed, the nations are just on the point of going beyond arbitration, in the ordinary sense of that word. The second Hague Conference cast its vote unanimously for the creation of a regular international court of justice with judges always in service and holding regular sessions. It failed to find a method of appointing the judges which would be satisfactory alike to the great and the small powers, but this difficulty

will undoubtedly be surmounted in a comparatively short time. The world, therefore, seems about to enter upon the era of judicial organization which will take international controversies out of the domain of violence and national conceit and passion and bring them under the dominion of law and reason. This is the great end toward which the arbitration movement has been tending, and which it is certain soon to reach under the pressure of the many forces which are now with ever-increasing energy and directness operating for its consummation.

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF ARBITRATION TREATIES WITH DATE OF SIGNATURE.

France and Great Britain,	14 October, 1903.
France and Italy,	23 December.
Great Britain and Italy,	1 February, 1904.
Denmark and The Netherlands,	12 February.
Spain and France,	26 February.
Spain and Great Britain,	27 February.
France and The Netherlands,	6 April.
Spain and Portugal,	31 May.
France and Norway,	9 July.
France and Sweden,	9 July.
Germany and Great Britain,	12 July.
Great Britain and Norway,	11 August.
Great Britain and Sweden,	11 August.
The Netherlands and Portugal,	1 October.
Belgium and Russia,	30 October.
Belgium and Switzerland,	15 November.
Great Britain and Portugal,	16 November.
Great Britain and Switzerland,	16 November.
Italy and Switzerland,	16 November.
Norway and Russia,	26 November.
Russia and Sweden,	26 November.
Belgium and Norway,	30 November.

Belgium and Sweden,	30 November.
Austria-Hungary and Switzerland,	3 December.
France and Switzerland,	14 December.
Sweden and Switzerland,	17 December.
Norway and Switzerland,	17 December.
Austria-Hungary and Great Britain,	11 January, 1905.
Belgium and Spain,	23 January.
Spain and Norway,	23 January.
Spain and Sweden,	23 January.
Great Britain and The Netherlands,	15 February.
Denmark and Russia,	16 February.
Italy and Peru,	18 April.
Belgium and Greece,	19 April.
Belgium and Denmark,	26 April.
Spain and Honduras,	5 May.
Portugal and Norway,	6 May.
Portugal and Sweden,	6 May.
Italy and Portugal,	11 May.
Belgium and Roumania,	27 May.
Portugal and Switzerland,	18 August.
Argentina and Brazil,	7 September.
Denmark and France,	15 September.
Denmark and Great Britain,	25 October.
Norway and Sweden,	26 October.
Denmark and Spain,	1 December.
Denmark and Italy,	16 December.
Austria-Hungary and Portugal,	13 February, 1906.
Denmark and Portugal,	20 March, 1907.
Spain and Switzerland,	14 May.
Italy and Mexico,	16 October.
Argentina and Italy,	16 October.
United States and France,	10 February, 1908.
United States and Switzerland,	29 February.
United States and Italy,	8 March.
United States and Mexico,	24 March.
United States and Great Britain,	4 April.
United States and Norway,	4 April.

United States and Portugal,	6 April.
United States and Spain,	20 April.
United States and The Netherlands,	2 May.
United States and Sweden,	2 May.
United States and Japan,	5 May.
United States and Denmark,	18 May.
United States and China,	8 October.
United States and Peru,	5 December.
United States and Salvador,	21 December.
United States and Argentina,	23 December.
Great Britain and Colombia,	30 December.
United States and Bolivia,	7 January, 1909.
United States and Ecuador,	7 January.
United States and Haiti,	7 January.
United States and Uruguay,	9 January.
United States and Chile,	13 January.
United States and Costa Rica,	13 January.
United States and Austria-Hungary,	15 January.
United States and Brazil,	23 January.